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Abstract: 
Work incentives are closely related to production performance. This paper presents evidence 
that the value added of a firm increases when relative labor costs rise, or the level of 
unemployment increases. Both circumstances imply evidence in favor of the efficiency wage 
model. This theory is consistent with the views of many managers and personal 
administrators, who tend to ascribe primary importance to wage setting as an incentive to 
increase effort. We use a micro panel data set of Spanish manufacturing firms, during the 
period 2004–2009, to simultaneously estimate a stochastic frontier of a firm’s value added 
and the inefficiency determinants. The data source is published in the Spanish Industrial 
Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE), collected 
by the Fundación SEPI. 
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1. Introduction.- 
The greatest problem faced by the Spanish economy is the high level of unemployment. 
During the period of economic growth that lasted from 1995 to 2007 the Spanish economy 
created a large number of jobs, only for them to be destroyed as easily as they had been 
created when the financial crisis began. Unemployment has grown uncontrollably, reaching 
18% in 2009 and it is currently close to 26% of the active population. This dramatic increase 
in unemployment is due fundamentally to the destruction of a large number of jobs with 
scarce added value, which was reflected in the low levels of productivity of the Spanish 
economy. The urgent need to create new jobs and the pressure exerted on Spain by 
international organisations were the motivating forces behind the recent reform of labour law, 
the fundamental objective of which was to make the labour market more flexible by 
cheapening redundancies and weakening the negotiating power of Trade Unions. Since the 
beginning of the crisis the real value of salaries has fallen drastically, but this fall has not 
been accompanied by a corresponding drop in the profit margins of businesses, and for this 
reason the measures adopted in the recent reforms have been perceived as unjust by the 
majority of the workers. 
These circumstances affect and shall undoubtedly continue to affect the quality of work. 
If the real value of salaries continues to fall then Spanish businesses will be unable to attract 
well-qualified workers. In fact, it will have the opposite effect, and we are already witnessing 
a process of de-capitalization caused by the forced exodus of highly-qualified workers to 
other European countries, as they have not had the opportunity to pursue their professional 
careers in Spain, either because there were no jobs available for them, or because the jobs that 
did exist did not adequately remunerate them for their level of training and expertise. The 
training these people received has been financed by Spanish society, but despite having 
assumed this cost, it will not see its benefits.  
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The persistence of a high level of involuntary unemployment contradicts the traditional 
microeconomic analysis of this type of situation. Why has the high level of competence 
among the unemployed not provoked a reduction in salaries sufficient to cause a drop in 
unemployment? There are many reasons why the labour market cannot function as a 
competitive market. We shall explain those that are, in our opinion, the most relevant. The 
social dimension of salaries makes it difficult for them to carry out the equalising role with 
respect to supply and demand that conventional economic theory attributes to prices in the 
market place. The existence of ethical norms in the labour market that condition the actions 
of the agents operating within it, impede purely optimizing behaviour. Time plays a far more 
important part in the function of the labour market than is recognised by the basic, 
extemporal model of supply and demand. Furthermore, what is exchanged in the labour 
market is not the “work” that will be used in the production process, but rather the 
“inclination to work”. The conversion of this capacity into work effectively carried out is a 
problem that businessmen face daily, as an integral and inseparable part of the production 
process. This is evidenced by both the habitual systems of incentives and bonuses that 
businesses use and by the need to supervise, in one way or another, the work done.  While 
this is self-evident to social commentators, it has a perturbing effect on the competitive model 
of the labour market. 
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence in favour of adjusting 
retributions to the efficiency of a firm. We provide evidence to suggest that above average 
labour costs increase the productivity of workers and therefore their efficiency. In this sense, 
higher relative labour costs are able to attract a better group of workers within the industrial 
sector. Labour costs include not only the salary paid to workers, but also social security 
payments and payments in kind, among other forms of retribution. Therefore, a systematic 
policy of reducing labour costs may lead to a poorer selection of workers for the firm, that is, 
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in the same way that the price of a product reflects its quality, the salary of workers ought to 
reflect the quality of work. It is important to distinguish between labour costs per worker and 
labour costs per unit of production, because what is relevant here is what firms are able to 
produce by paying these labour costs. The introduction of new technologies and managerial 
decisions regarding the innovation of production processes and products are extremely 
important in order to guarantee a high level of competiveness and efficiency in the long term. 
The Spanish model of production that has been based fundamentally on construction and 
speculation distorted the system of business incentives that aim to achieve a greater level of 
technical and economic efficiency. Now there is a hurried attempt to regain competiveness by 
reducing labour costs, without any apparent awareness that these measures may damage our 
level of efficiency in the medium and long term.  
The rise in unemployment during the period from 2007-2009 has produced an increase in 
the technical efficiency of businesses. This result, together with that mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph is coherent with the existing models of salary efficiency. The enormous 
level of unemployment that the Spanish economy is experiencing has meant that a high 
percentage of the population are in a situation of social exclusion. The fear of being forced 
into this group undoubtedly raises the costs of redundancy for workers, and they are obliged 
to increase their efforts at work and to accept negative changes in their circumstances, such as 
a decrease in redundancy payments and a reduction in their salary negotiating power. 
However, some firms are unwilling to decrease salaries because a reduction in salaries 
negatively affects production. The models of efficiency wages are able to explain this 
relationship between salaries and the effectiveness of work. A high level of unemployment 
increases the effectiveness of work as the worker increases his/her effort because he/she is 
aware of his/her reduced probability of finding new employment if fired from his/her present 
job for lack of effort (Shapiro y Stiglitz, 1984). In the sociological model posited by Akerlof 
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(1982), firms are able to augment the efforts of their workers by paying them a salary higher 
than the average market salary, but with the implicit condition that the workers will 
reciprocate by working harder than the minimum effort required by their employees. Industry 
and occupation variables where found to be relatively important explanatory variables for 
variation in earnings. Murphy and Topel (1987) also used longitudinal data, and produced 
different results from those obtained by using cross-section data.  
In Spain studies by Sánchez and Toharia (2000) provided evidence on the testable 
implications of efficiency wages, productivity and the composition of the labour force; 
Martín-Marcos and Suárez-Gálvez (2000) analysed the existence of technical inefficiency of 
production in the Spanish manufacturing sector. Others focused on particular determinants of 
efficiency; for instance, Delgado et al (2002) centred on the relation between efficiency and 
exports while Díaz and Sánchez (2004) examined the link between technical efficiency and 
the makeup of the labour force and in (2008) focused on the performance of small and 
medium-sized manufacturing firms in relation to technical inefficiency and its determinants. 
With other econometric techniques, Fariñas and Ruano (2004) analysed the contribution of 
continuing firms and turnover to total factor productivity; Huergo and Jamandreu (2004) 
measured the probability of introducing innovations by manufacturing firms at different 
stages of their existence. All of them used the EESE data set of Spanish manufacturing firms.  
The novelty that our work incorporates is that it estimates the effect of a higher relative 
labour cost per worker, on firms’ value added through a stochastic frontier panel data model. 
Here we obtain empirical evidence that a higher relative cost improves productivity in 
Spanish manufacturing firms. We also test the differences in efficiency between the years of 
estimation, differentiating between the expansionary period 2004-2006 and the recessive 
period 2007-2009. We maintain that the increment in unemployment suffered after 2007 
reduced technical inefficiency and is evidence in favour of the idea that an increase in the 
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cost of job loss stimulates productivity. Our paper also differs from pervious literature in 
Spain, because we use an improved frontier model and we calculate the real impact of the 
coefficient of technical inefficiency through the method of Wan (2002).  
The paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 introduces the econometric method of 
estimation. In Sect. 3 we describe the sample and the data.  In Sect. 4 we present the results 
of the estimated frontier and the inefficiency determinants. Finally in Sect. 5 we summarise 
the main conclusion. 
 
2. Stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model.- 
We use the SFA (Stochastic Frontier Approach) to estimate a production frontier 
with inefficiency effects. Specifically, we use a panel data version of the Aigner et al. (1977) 
approach, following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Wang (2002) specification, in which 
technical inefficiency is estimated from the stochastic frontier and simultaneously explained 
by a set of variables representative of the firms’ characteristics. This approach avoids the 
inconsistency problems of the two-stage approach used in previous empirical works when 
analysing the inefficiency determinants4.  
The model can be expressed as: 
 
)exp();( iititit uvXfY       (1) 
 
                                                            
4 In a two-stage procedure, first of all a stochastic frontier production function is estimated 
and the inefficiency scores are obtained under the assumption of independently and 
identically distributed inefficiency effects. But in the second step, inefficiency effects are 
assumed to be a function of some firm-specific variables, which contradicts the assumption of 
identically distributed inefficiency effects. 
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Where i indicates firms and t represents the period, X is the set of inputs;  is the set of 
parameters, vit is a two-sided term representing the random error, assumed to be iid N(0,v2); 
ui is a non-negative random variable representing the inefficiency, which is assumed to be 
distributed independently and obtained by truncation at zero of N( it ,u2). The mean of this 
distribution is assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory variables:  
 
itZ'0it       (2) 
 
Given that technical efficiency is the ratio of observed production over the 
maximum technical output obtainable for a firm (when there is no inefficiency), the 
efficiency index (TE) of firm i in year t could be written as5: 
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The efficiency scores obtained from expression (3) takes value one when the firm is 
efficient, and less than one otherwise. 
The function coefficients () and the inefficiency model parameters () were 
estimated using a panel data technique to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 The estimates of the inefficiency effects model only indicate the direction of the 
effects over inefficiency levels. We calculated the marginal effects to show how a change in 
an exogenous variable affects inefficiency. Following Wang (2002), we obtained the 
                                                            
5 Individual efficiency scores ui, which are unobservable, can be predicted by the mean or the 
mode of the conditional distribution of ui given the value of (vi-ui) using the technique 
suggested by Jondrow et al (1982). 
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marginal effects by taking the derivatives of the unconditional mean of the efficiency 
predictor with respect to each of the inefficiency effects variables (ZM)6:  
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Where δM are the coefficients of the inefficiency model,  Φ  and    are the probability and 
cumulative density functions of a standard normal distribution respectively, and Λ is: 
 
22
22
22
*
*
uv
uv
uv
itituiv xy










    (5) 
 
3. Data and variables.- 
The Data source is published in the Spanish Industrial Survey on Business Strategies 
(Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE). The data is collected by the Fundacion 
SEPI and sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Industry. This is supplied as a panel of firms’ 
representative of twenty industrial sectors. A distinctive of the data is that companies 
contributing in the survey were chosen according to a careful selection structure. The sample 
of firms includes almost all Spanish manufacturing firms with more than two hundred 
employees. Firms employing between ten and two hundred employees were chosen according 
to a stratified random sample representative of the population of small firms. Given the 
procedure used to select firms participating in the survey, both samples of small and large 
                                                            
6 Wang (2002) points out that the marginal effects on the conditional mean of ui are almost 
intractable and shows that it is equivalent to use the mean of ui to calculate them.  
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firms can be considered as samples that allow us to estimate the distribution of any of the 
characteristics of the population of Spanish manufacturing firms with information available 
from our data set. Each year a number of additional firms were selected according to a 
random sampling procedure among the whole population of firms. This selection is 
conducted using the same proportion as in the original sample (see Fariñas and Jaumandreu 
(2004) for technical details of the sample) 
From the original sample, a number of firms have been eliminated, most of them due 
to a lack of relevant data. Others were eliminated because they reported a value-added annual 
growth rate per worker in excess of 500% (in absolute value), and some were rejected 
because they have fewer than ten workers and, in both cases, they would distort the analysis. 
Also, we do not include firms after a merger or division process in our sample data. Our 
sample includes 2,247 firms from the ESEE Survey and refers to an unbalanced panel where 
we have eliminated those firms for which we do not have two consecutive years of data. Our 
period of analysis runs from 2004 to 2009. Summary statistics of the data are presented in 
Table 1. 
We estimate a stochastic translog production function adding a term of inefficiency, 
whose mean is the function of a set of inefficiency determinants.7 
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The variables used for estimation of the production frontier are the value-added, 
such as the output variable, and the number of employees in the firm, capital stock and trend, 
                                                            
7 We imposed the usual symmetry conditions to the translog function 
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as input variables (Xit), the industrial sector dummies (Si). In Appendix we present a more 
precise definition of the variables used for estimation and the definition of the inefficiency 
determinants considered. 
 
4. Analysis of the results.- 
From the frontier approach, we obtain a measure of a firm’s technical inefficiency 
compared with the best observations of the sample. The value of the estimates allows us to 
explain the differences in the inefficiency effects among firms. As technological and market 
conditions can vary over sectors, we have included sector dummy variables in the production 
function in order to be able to control them.  
The maximum-likelihood estimates of the production frontier parameters, defined in 
equation (4), given the specification for the inefficiency effects, defined in equation (5), are 
presented in Table 2. We use the translog specification for the production function and we 
obtain the expected signs of the inputs estimates.  
In this section we present three estimates of the stochastic frontier of production with 
three alternative inefficiency models. These three estimates all include size variables and 
while the first two include relative labor costs (RW) the third estimate uses instead the labor 
costs per unit of production. In the first two cases we have analyzed the effect of relative 
salaries on inefficiency, while in the third case we have measured effectiveness in terms of 
production, in which importance is given not only to the retributions received by the workers, 
but also to the processes of production employed by firms and their organization with regard 
to their production processes.   
In the first case the effect of the economic cycle is measured throughout the years in the 
sample, and takes as a point of reference the year 2008, which is the year in which 
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unemployment began to rise, moving from 8,3 % in 2007 to 11 % in 2008; in the second and 
third cases we have constructed a fictional variable to account for take into account the 
impact of 2008 and 2009. 
The results obtained in Table 2 demonstrate that higher relative labour costs reduce the 
level of inefficiency in firms. This is made apparent by the coefficients in this variable, as in 
both estimates they are negative and significant. These greater relative costs per worker act as 
a proxy for the quality of labour. Therefore those firms that are willing to pay more within the 
same sector reduce the problems caused by an adverse selection of the workforce generated 
by a poor remuneration policy, avoid the problems occasioned by a continually changing 
workforce and motivate their staff to make more effort. When we calculate the marginal 
effects of this variable in Table 3, we find that the impact results in an 8 % reduction of 
inefficiency in estimate (1) and close to a 7% reduction in estimate (2). In the same sector of 
industry firms that seek to attract the highest qualified workers in the market place and obtain 
a higher rate of productivity per worker by means of a policy of paying high salaries and 
providing good working conditions coexist with firms that use a policy of low salaries to 
increase their rates of productivity per worker. The use of one policy or another will depend 
to a great extent on the characteristics of the company. 
The coefficient of unit labor costs (ULC) is positive and significant, which indicates, as it 
should, that higher labor costs per unit of product widen the difference with the frontier of 
efficient production. The marginal value of the coefficient is 1.4, which shows that its impact 
is far greater than any other factor included in the inefficiency model. This is without doubt 
the key point. What is important here are not the labor costs in themselves but what the firm 
is able to achieve with these costs in terms of production. Therefore, the objective should be 
not simply to reduce labor costs but to change the model of production by incorporating more 
efficient uses of technology and by training the workforce. 
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The size of firms is another important factor to be considered when analyzing the 
efficiency of firms. In Spain most firms are small or medium sized businesses. In our sample 
firms that had more than 500 employees made up only 9.45 % of the total. The coefficients, 
of the three sizes of firm analyzed, where positive and significant with respect to large firms. 
This result suggests that the smaller a business is, the further it is likely to be from the 
frontier formed by the most efficient firms in the sample. In Table 3 the marginal effect is 
greater the smaller the size of the firm in question. Therefore we may conclude that if 
Spanish businesses increase their average size they will reduce their distance from the 
stochastic frontier. This result may be partially explained by the fact that large businesses 
invest much more in research and development than medium and small size businesses. Firms 
with more than 500 workers are those that receive the highest percentage for innovation in 
the process of production (54.60%) and in the product (43.01%), (Díaz and Sánchez, 2012). 
5. Concluding remarks.- 
In the context of globalization the current policy of indiscriminate salary reduction 
that is being carried out in Spain is affecting productivity and will continue to do so in the 
long term. In this paper we have obtained evidence of the impact of relative labor costs on the 
efficiency of businesses, finding that those firms which pay higher than average salaries in 
their sector reduce inefficiency. What is relevant here are not the labor costs of the businesses 
themselves but rather what firms may obtain by paying these costs. What is pertinent are the 
costs per unit of production, which are determined by labor costs on the one hand and on the 
other by the technology employed, the organizational structure of firms and the ability of 
managers to organize efficiently the factors involved in production.  
A policy such as the one pursued in Spain that is based on the systematic worsening 
of labor conditions without firms making any changes in their model of production in the 
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middle or long term will result in qualified workers leaving the country, and that will in turn 
impact negatively on productivity. The Spanish economy will finance the training of young 
workers who have no real prospects of employment in Spain, either because there will be no 
jobs that correspond to their level of training or because the remuneration offered for those 
jobs available will be excessively low compared to other countries in the European Union and 
beyond.   
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APPENDIX: Description of variables and Results 
 
Variables of Stochastic Frontier estimations: 
VA: The value added in real terms. This is a dependent variable. 
CAPITAL STOCK (K): Inventory value of fixed assets excluding grounds and buildings. 
L: Total employment by firm. 
T: This is the time trend. 
Sector classification: There are seven dummy variables that take value one when the firm 
belongs to the corresponding sector of activity; otherwise this value is zero.  
SEC1: Meat and manufacturing of meat; food industry and tobacco drinks; textiles, clothing 
and shoes; leather, shoes and derivatives. SEC2: Wood and derivatives, paper and 
derivatives.  
SEC2: Wood and derivatives, paper and derivatives. Category of Referece. 
SEC3: Chemical products; cork and plastic; non-metallic mineral products.  
SEC4: Basic metal products; manufactured metal products; industrial equipment.  
SEC5: Office machinery and others; electrical materials.  
SEC6: Cars and engines; other material transport.  
SEC7: Other manufactured products.  
Determinants of efficiency: 
VU09: Variation of unemployment rate for the period 2007-2009 with respect to 2004, 2005 
and 2006. 
17 
 
RW:  The ratio of firms labour cost by worker over average labour cost by worker for 
industrial sector. 
Time: 
There are six dummy variables that take value one when the firm belongs to the 
corresponding year; otherwise this value is zero. The category of reference is 2008. 
Size: 
- SIZE 1: Firms with no more than 100 workers. 
- SIZE 2: from 101 up to 200. 
- SIZE 3: from 201 up to 500. 
- SIZE 4: Firms with a number of workers higher than 500. Category of reference 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Min. Max Mean Standard Deviation
          VA* 110.29 10689161.42 162610.05 553841.99 
K* 10.94 33091212.35 357083.77 1609312.16 
L 10.00 14400.00 236.90 724.36 
RW 0.008 340.63 1.94 10.20 
U 8.3 18 10.87 3.28 
 
(*) Euros 
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Table 2- Stochastic Frontier Analysis: Translog Production function estimates 
Variables   Coefficient 
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Coefficient 
(3) 
Constant β0 5.837* 
(45.21) 
5.628* 
(46.84) 
8.359 
(0.000) 
T β1 0.155* 
(10.59) 
0.160* 
(10.74) 
0.143* 
(9.767) 
L β2 1.531* 
(41.09) 
1.395* 
(40.72) 
1.175* 
(25.13) 
K β3 0.038* 
(2.24) 
0.000 
(0,061) 
-0.064* 
(-3.817) 
                 K2 β 11 0.027* 
(15.16) 
0.032* 
(19.16) 
0.029* 
(16.69) 
L2 β 22 -0.011 
(-1.67) 
0.018* 
(3.04) 
0.028* 
(3.770) 
T2 β 33 -0.013* 
(-8.77) 
-0.013* 
(-8.70) 
-0.011* 
(-7.900) 
KxL β 12 -0.153* -0.174* -0.133* 
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(-10.78) (-13.61) (-9.205) 
LxT β 13 0.020* 
(6.35) 
0.023* 
(7.07) 
0.219* 
(6.491) 
KxT β 23 -0.017* 
(-8.21) 
-0.018* 
(-8.68) 
-0.017* 
(-8.056) 
Meat and 
manufacturing of 
meat; food 
industry…. 
 -0.047 
(-1.20) 
 
-0.041 
(-1.18) 
-0.006 
(-1.771) 
 
Chemical products; 
non-metallic mineral 
products. 
 
 
 
0.137* 
(3.39) 
 
0.105* 
(2.89) 
 
0.155* 
(4.052) 
 
Basic metal products; 
industrial equipment. 
 
 
 
0.192* 
(4.77) 
 
0.182* 
(4.98) 
 
0.228* 
(6.060) 
 
Office machinery and 
others; electric 
materials. 
 
 
 
0.216* 
(4.44) 
 
0.196* 
(4.60) 
 
0.250* 
(5.315) 
Cars and engines; 
other material 
 0.060 
(1.38) 
0.041 
(1.044) 
0.102* 
(2.390) 
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transport. 
 
Others manufactured 
products. 
 
 
 
0.082** 
(1.93) 
 
0.054 
(1.42) 
 
0.138* 
(3.478) 
Inefficiency Model  
Constant δ 0 4.355* 
(23.63) 
3.931* 
(26.08) 
7.609 
(0.00) 
 
RW 
 
δ 1 
 
-0.369* 
(-14.51) 
 
-0.393* 
(-17.70) 
 
 
------------ 
ULC δ ‘1 ------------ ------------ 3.08* 
(17.381) 
Year 2004 δ 2 0.376* 
(4.37) 
------------ ------------ 
Year 2005 δ 3 0.294* 
(3.31) 
------------ ------------ 
Year 2006 δ 4 0.168* 
(2.03) 
----------- ------------ 
Year 2007 δ 5 0.087 
(1.03) 
------------ ------------ 
Year 2009 δ 6 -0.003 ------------ ------------ 
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(-0.031) 
VU09 δ 7 ------------ -0.054* 
(-4.931) 
-0.041* 
(-3.633) 
Size 1 δ 8 0.972* 
(6.65) 
0.399* 
( 2.92) 
1.058* 
(7.492) 
Size 2 δ 9 0.574* 
(4.08) 
0.024 
(0.189) 
0.777* 
(5.851) 
Size 3 δ 10 0.200 
(1.61) 
-0.135 
(-1.147) 
0.538* 
(4.740) 
Lambda  1.111* 
(58.45) 
1.034* 
(60.56) 
1.056* 
(61.135) 
Sigma (u)  0.382* 
(67.64) 
0.359* 
(67.71) 
0.361* 
(69.925) 
      (*) Significant at 1%; (**) Significant at 10%,.T-Student between brackets. 
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Table 3: Marginal effects of inefficiency variables 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
RW 
-0.08092167 -0.06685099 ---------- 
ULC 
---------- ---------- 1.39234951 
A2004 0.14000806 ---------- ---------- 
A2005 0.10956904            ----------         ---------- 
A2006 0.06237158 ---------- ---------- 
A2007 0.0320365 --------- ---------- 
A2009 -0.00110285 ----------- ---------- 
VU09 --------------- -0.01854108 -0.01455968 
Size1 0.44890939 0.16434714 0.45742946 
Size2 0.21589421 0.00888606 0.29055445 
Size3 0.07416443 -0.04847444 0.20074521 
 
 
